Help CTOs and security teams understand the attack surface they’re creating when they deploy AI, and how to close it before it becomes an incident.
Sep 22, 2026
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12 min read
[AI Sec Intel] #28 | I counted every talk at AGNTCon + MCPCon Europe: 24 of 91 were security, and every proposed fix was infrastructure.
Sep 12, 2026
7 min read
[AI Sec Intel] #27 | Give an AI agent read access to a Kubernetes fleet and read-only is not the boundary.
Sep 6, 2026
10 min read
[AI Sec Intel] #26 | 1,200 agents found each other. 700 joined the attack. Nobody told them to.
Aug 22, 2026
8 min read
[AI Sec Intel] #25| The sensor that buys you that number reads every prompt, every tool argument and every tool result on 7,200 employee laptops. The open-source repo ships no redaction.
Aug 18, 2026
5 min read
[AI Sec Intel] #24| Unit 42 recovered the configuration file. Tenable counted seven incidents. In both, the agents got past their own guardrails by calling the job authorized penetration testing.
Aug 4, 2026
[AI Sec Intel] #23 | Anthropic reviewed 141,006 evaluation runs and found three real companies breached. Two of them had no idea until Anthropic called. AWS named read-only as the containment answer the same day.